This would mean that the premises

[chandon55]

First, it might be claimed that, by harbouring a fugitive from British justice (which would include from the process of extradition from the UK to Sweden pursuant to the European arrest warrant issued by Sweden), Ecuador ‘ceases to use [the premises of its diplomatic mission] for the purposes of its mission’, as per section 1(3)(a) DCPA, with the result, again phone number library as per section 1(3)(a) DCPA, that this land ceases be diplomatic premises for the purposes of article 22(1) VCDR and therefore, via the DPA, of UK law. are no longer inviolable, with the consequence that the UK police could enter and arrest Assange.

This would be a highly unusual interpretation of section 1(3)(a) DCPA, to say the very least. To say the most, it would be utterly implausible. The situation referred to in section 1(3)(a) is where the state whose embassy it is ceases to use the premises as an embassy. This construction is supported by section 1(6) DCPA, according to which, ‘f a State intends to cease using land as premises of its mission or as consular premises, it shall give the Secretary of State notice of that intention, specifying the date on which it intends to cease so using them’. Section 1(3)(a) DCPA does not refer to a situation where the embassy remains an embassy but is used in a way that the UK government considers incompatible with the embassy’s functions as an embassy.